Montgomery and informed choice: Not yet uhuru
This theme issue of Clinical Risk revisits grounds that were covered by the journal 11-15 years ago. 1, 2 Arguably, not much has changed in the intervening years. The decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland) 3 has been hailed as a landmark judgment. To the extent that it establishes the legal doctrine of 'informed consent' (the requirement for full disclosure of material risks to the patient, with the standard of disclosure being determined not by the medical profession but by the court) in this jurisdiction, it was indeed a landmark judgment. As pointed out in this issue of Clinical Risk and elsewhere, however, the judgment restates what already exists in published professional guidance. Another reason why the impact of the judgment on clinical practice will probably be less than momentous is that much of the discussion that followed Montgomery has been limited to the legal duty of health professionals to disclose sufficient information to their patients. The opportunity has not been seized to address key elements of the medical consultation. What are these elements?
One element is the paradigm of consent that is operationalised in clinical practice. The model of consent that is applied in actual practice (contrived consent) differs from that described in professional guidance (bona fide consent). 4 Bona fide consent is where the patient makes an informed choice after a dialogue with the doctor, in a collaborative relationship. In contrived consent, the patient is presented with a menu of choices, and a response is elicited. The menu may be accompanied by a large quantity of information, most of it not specific to the patient, or little or no information. The emphasis is not on the patient's understanding of information but on his or her signal that the doctor may proceed with treatment. The court in Montgomery referred to this (at para 90), when it said that the doctor's duty is not fulfilled by 'bombarding the patient with technical information which she cannot reasonably be expected to grasp'. Medical professionalism demands that the gap between the espoused and the operationalised methods of consent should be closed, but there has been no post-Montgomery rush to achieve this.
The second element is the emphasis on choice in contemporary health care. Long before Montgomery, commentators had advocated a shift from 'consent' to 'choice' or 'informed choice'. 2, 5 Skegg justifies this shift in emphasis as follows:
Consent does, of course, involve choice. However the choice is usually a matter of deciding whether or not to consent to a particular proposal. The role of consent is often seen to be that of protecting a practitioner from a risk of legal proceedings: information is disclosed to ensure that the consent is 'legally effective'. A shift of emphasis to 'informed choice' could give greater prominence to the provision of information about alternatives, and to the provision of information by people who will not themselves be involved in carrying out the particular procedure to which consent may eventually be given. 5 In Montgomery, the court (at para 75) noted that patients are now 'widely treated as consumers exercising choices'. The crux of that case was that Nadine Montgomery had been denied the right to make an informed choice between the option of vaginal birth and the option of a planned caesarean delivery, her obstetrician having chosen to make that choice on behalf of the patient. Montgomery justifies a shift from consent to informed choice.
The third element pertains to the transactional nature of the medical consultation. Case law on consent has been concerned mostly with information disclosure, particularly the question of how much information should be disclosed and who determines this. Communication between doctor and patient is essential for meaningful expression of the patient's right to self-determination, but this does not appear to feature in a meaningful way in the consent model. Clements 2 called for emphasis on dialogue between clinician and patient as a requirement for promoting informed choice: It is high time for a change of emphasis; we should no longer be looking over our shoulder at the lawyers so as to escape a charge of battery; rather, we should be seeking to improve the dialogue with the patient to make sure that she has the information necessary to express her choice of treatment. 2 In the same vein, the Supreme Court stated in Montgomery that:
. . . the doctor's advisory role involves dialogue, the aim of which is to ensure that the patient understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and risks of the proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that she is then in a position to make an informed decision.
In the wake of Montgomery, the importance of dialogue appears to have been overshadowed by (usually sterile) arguments about whether clinicians have enough time in busy clinics and wards to fully engage patients in dialogue. Manson and O'Neill have given an erudite exposition of the place of communication in consent. 6 Guidance on improvement of dialogue between clinician and patient has previously been published in this journal, per Clements:
To communicate choice effectively, we must first listen so as to gather data, so as to understand the patient and to develop a rapport and be able to respond to the patient's emotional needs. Communication in this context consists of: Engaging; Empathising; Educating; Enlisting. Engaging with the patient includes greeting and introduction, seating and body language, history taking, and determining her expectations. Empathising means having imagination for the needs of others. 'To know what kind of person has a disease is as essential as to know what kind of disease a patient has'. Education includes the imparting of technical information in a form and in language the patient can readily understand. Finally enlisting: only at this point in the interview does the clinician ask the patient to exercise choice and to indicate which treatment is preferred. It will always be appropriate to record that decision.
The final element is the role played by the patient. The Supreme Court referred (at para 93) to patients 'taking responsibility for the ultimate choice to undergo that treatment' and (at para 81) to patients 'accepting responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of their choices'. The consent model does not take due cognisance of the patient's responsibility in the medical consultation. One study found that at the point of signing a consent form, many patients are unaware that this is meant to be an expression of self-determination; they perceive it as an exercise to protect the doctor. 7 The NHS constitution prescribes not only the rights of patients but also their responsibilities. 8 In discussing informed choice, both the duties of the doctor and the responsibility of the patient should be addressed.
The question arises whether the consent model is fit for the purpose of addressing these elements. Academic commentators have long recognised that the consent model is sub-optimal for protecting patient selfdetermination, but suitable alternatives have not been proposed. One commentator 5 noted that:
Criticism of the Sidaway decision, and the hope that the House of Lords will come to adopt a different approach, has dominated English academic writing relating to 'informed consent' . . .. . . It has distracted attention from the important question of whether the law of torts can ever have much of a role in protecting the legitimate interests of patients to be informed about risks and alternatives. It has also distracted attention from the question whether there are other ways in which the law could play a more significant role . . .. (at pp. [146] [147] Human rights law does not provide a solution to the limitations of the consent model. Nor does contract law, at least in the UK health system where the vast majority of patients are publicly funded rather than private patients. A property approach to the protection of patients' self-determination, rooted in property law and medical professionalism, has been advocated 9 but is yet to be applied in the courts of law or on the shopfloor of clinical practice. The property model comprises the following tenets:
. the patient's right to self-determination is protected as a distinct legal right . the patient's right to bodily integrity is a proprietary right . the patient also has a proprietary right in his/her legitimate expectation of involvement in decision making about their own treatment . correlative to the patient's proprietary rights, the doctor has a fiduciary duty to enable the patient make an informed decision, by providing relevant information . pursuant to this fiduciary duty, the doctor-patient consultation is transactional (rather than the unidirectional passive transfer of data that are practised in consent discussions)
. there is a bilateral distribution of responsibilities between doctor and patient: the doctor has a responsibility to take reasonable steps to ensure that the patient understands the information provided, and the patient takes responsibility for the information communicated to the doctor and also for his/her own decision.
In due course, answers to the limitations of the consent model will emerge. For now, champions of patient selfdetermination can look at Montgomery and say 'not yet uhuru!'
